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Vincelette: Water Law - When Water Quantity Regulation Is Not Water Quantity

Water Law-When Water Quantity Regulation is Not Water Quantity
Regulation. Riverside v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983).
Riverside Irrigation District and the Public Service Company of Colorado (Riverside) planned to build a dam and reservoir on Wildcat Creek,
a tributary of the South Platte River in Morgan County, Colorado.' It
was authorized to store and use the water under water rights validly
decreed in Colorado courts.' Riverside was required to obtain a dredge
and fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water
Act 3 for placing fill material into navigable waters of the United States.

Because Wildcat Creek is an intermittent stream above the headwaters
of a non-tidal stream, 4 the dam developers believed they were entitled to
an automatic nation-wide permit for their dredge and fill activities,5 and
brought suit when it was denied.
In this suit, Riverside argued that the federal authorities infringed
upon its state water rights. It contended that the permit denial was based
on the depleted flow of the South Platte River that would result from the
dam's operation, a matter of water quantity regulation which, they argued,
was outside of the Corps' authority.
In reply, the Corps never contended that the denial of the permit decision was based on federal authority to regulate water quantity. Rather,
the Corps argued that it was exercising federal police powers by considering the project's environmental effects, and that it reached a no-permit
decision on those grounds. 7 The district court sided with the Corps, holding
that it had police power authority to deny an automatic permit to a project which was likely to jeopardize the habitat of an endangered species.'
An appeal of the district court's decision is now pending before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Congress has made protection of the environment a very high priority, as demonstrated by much legislation passed in the 1960's and 1970's.9
Perhaps the greatest emphasis has been placed on protecting endangered
species of wildlife and habitats on which they depend. Concern for habitat
1. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 1981), remanded
sub. noma. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Colo. 1983).
2. Complaint of Riverside Irrigation Dist. and Public Service Co. of Colorado at 4,
Riverside v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981), remandedsub. nom. Riverside v. Andrews,
568 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Colo. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
3. The Clean Water Act is the popular name for the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
4. Complaint, supra note 2, at 7.
5. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4 (1984) stipulates that nationwide permits have been issued for
discharges into certain waters including "non-tidal rivers ... that are located above the
headwaters."
6. Riverside v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. at 587.
7. Id. at 588.
8. Id. at 590.
9. See, e.g., M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 463-67 (1977).
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preservation has been codified in the Endangered Species Act, which requires that construction projects, including planned and existing water
projects, may not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered
species." Riverside v. Andrews illustrates the impasse that arises when
the enforcement of federal environmental laws collide with state created
and traditionally state regulated water rights. Thus far the Tenth Circuit has maintained that federally mandated environmental protection
takes precedence over claims of state sovereignty in the area of water
quantity regulation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should continue
to place the highest priority on preserving and maintaining the natural
environment and all species dependent upon it.

BACKGROUND

Expansion of Corps Authority
Under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, it has been illegal
since 1899 to discharge refuse, including dredge and fill material, into
United States waters without a permit issued by the Army Corps of
Engineers." The Corps' jurisdiction was originally derived from its
authority to protect the navigability of United States waters for
defensive and commercial purposes. 3 In the late 1960's, however, environmentalists used section 13 of the Act as a means to control pollufrom strictly navigational contion, directing the Corps' orientation away
4
cerns to protecting the environment.
An early example of a pollution case brought under section 13 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act" is United States v. Standard Oil Co. 6 The
Supreme Court upheld the Corps' authority to indict Standard Oil for its
discharge of oil into the St. John River. The Court held that regardless
of the oil's industrial or other value, it adversely affected the river and
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). See also Tarlock, The EndangeredSpecies Act and
LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
11. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982), which provides
in part that:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause to be deposited
either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any
refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any tributary
of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water.
Western Water Rights, 20

12. Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Programof the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503, 506 (1977).
13. Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Correctionsin the Section 404 Program, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1092, 1096 (1978).
14. Parish & Morgan, History, Practiceand Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation: ReconsideringSection 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 45
(1982).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).

16. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
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was "refuse" as defined by section 13.1" Because the effect on navigability was negligible, the Supreme Court clearly signalled that the Corps'
authority also extended to punishing acts which were environmentally
harmful.
Four years later, in Zabel v. Tabb,'" the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that environmental considerations must
pervade the Corps' decision-making process with respect to permit
issuance."' At the outset, the opinion noted the "depth [of]
the contem'20
porary interest in the preservation of the environment.
The Zabel suit was initiated by landowners who wished to compel the
Corps of Engineers to issue a dredge and fill permit." The Corps' district
engineer had recommended that the permit application be denied even
though there would be "no material adverse effect on navigation.' '22 The
Corps' denial was based on the harmful effects that the project would have
on fish and wildlife, and a conclusion that the project "would be contrary
to the public interest. 23 The landowners argued that the Corps was limited
in its consideration to the effects of the project on navigation, and that
it could not refuse a permit on any other grounds.2 '
In the Zabel opinion, the court of appeals held that the Corps' authority could not be narrowly constrained by the dictates of the dredge and
fill permit regulations considered in isolation. Rather, the court found that
while acting in accordance with one statutory responsibility, the Corps
was "required to take heed of, sometimes effectuate and other times not
thwart other valid statutory governmental policies." 25 The court found
that on the facts of Zabel, additional considerations were imposed on the
Corps by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,26 and the National En17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
Id at 209.
Id at 200-01.
Id

22. Id at 202.

23. The Corps' regulations list general policies for evaluating permit applications at
33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1984). The first policy listed is that all applications shall be subject to
Public Interest Review, which requires a broad consideration of a project's impact.
The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the
probable impact including cumulative impacts of the proposed activity and

its intended use on the public interest. The benefits which reasonably may be
expected to accrue from the proposal must be balanced against its reasonably
foreseeable detriments. ... All factors which may be relevant to the proposal
must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof.among those are

conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands,
cultural values, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, flood plain values, land
use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral
needs and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people. No permit will be
granted unless its issuance is found to be in the public interest.
Id (emphasis added).
24. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Id at 209.
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667(d) (1982).
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vironmental Policy Act. 7 In complying with the requirements of those
Acts, there was no doubt that the Corps could "refuse on conservation
grounds to grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act." '
The Standard Oil and Zabel decisions were consistent with the results
of a study conducted by the Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee.29 The subcommittee found that the Army Corps of Engineers
should play an increased role in protecting the natural environment in conjunction with its regulation of the nation's waters.30 The report stated that
until 1968 the Corps narrowly circumscribed its duties with regard to
dredge and fill permits, confining itself to issues of navigation.3 1 The report
noted that the Corps had an "obligation to consider all facets of the public
interest," as well as the national policy and directives embodied in other
statutes, "to minimize pollution, maximize recreation, protect aesthetics,
preserve natural resources, and promote the comprehensive planning and
use of water bodies to enhance the public interest rather than private
gain."32 Thus, the Corps' historic role of navigation-enhancing regulation
expanded to include regulation which was environmentally protective.
Corps Authority Under the Clean Water Act
The 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act33 codified the Corps'
environmental role. The amendments set out one permitting scheme requiring that all dischargers of polluting materials obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit from the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency.34 Dredge and fill material was defined
as a pollutant under the 1972 amendments. 30 Rather than duplicating the
Corps' permitting authority over dredge and fill activity under the Rivers
and Harbors Act with another permit system administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, section 404 of the 1972 amendments gave
the Corps dredge and fill permitting authority under the Clean Water
36
Act.
Section 511 of the Act noted that it did not diminish the Corps'
authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.11 The legislative
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
28. Zabel, 430 F.2d at 214.
29. COMMITTEE ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How THE CORPS
OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 917,

91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited
30.
31.
32.
33.

as COMMITTEE ON Gov'T OPERATIONS].
Id at 1.
Id at 2.
Id. at 3. See supra note 23.
Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86

Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5) (1982) notes that section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 is superseded by this section and that applications pending at the time of its enactment will be deemed applications under this section.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). The term pollutant is defined to include "rock, sand,
[and] cellar dirt...
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
37. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 511, 86 Stat. 816, 893 11972).
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history of the 1972 Amendments indicated that the express underlying
purpose of the Clean Water Act was the enhancement of the environment 38-consideration of which had already been charged to the Corps
under the Rivers and Harbors Act in United States v. Standard Oil,39 Zabel
v. Tabb," and by the House Committee on Government Operations.41
In addition to extending the Corps' substantive jurisdiction to include
water quality and environmental protection, the 1972 amendments gave
the Corps more water to oversee under an expansive definition of navigable
waters. The Clean Water Act applied to more waters than the Corps had
policed pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.42 The Corps was
reluctant to see its jurisdiction expanded, and it refused to regulate under
the Clean Water Act's more liberal definition of navigable waters until
forced to do so by the decision in NaturalResources Defense Counci4 Inc.
v. Calloway.43 The Calloway decision noted that Congress had defined
waters "to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.... As used in the Water Act, the term is not limited
to the traditional tests of navigability."4 The court also found that the
38.

COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-

1972, CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3776, 3826.
39. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
40. 430 F.2d 199 (1970).
41. COMMITTEE ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 29.
42. The waters regulated by the Corps under its retained Rivers and Harbors Act authority are "navigable waters" as defined at 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1984): "Navigable waters of the
United States are those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are
presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport
interstate or foreign commerce."
This is a much more limited set of waters than those included under the Clean Water
Act's section 502(7) "navigable waters" terminology. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). "Waters
of the United States" as used in section 520.7 are defined at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1984) and
include:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes,
wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce including any such waters:
(i) which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travels for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) from which fish or shell fish could be taken and sold in interstate
or foreign commerce; or
(iii) which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries
in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United
States under this definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of
this section;
(6) The territorial sea;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) of this section.
43. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
44. Id. at 686.
MENTS OF
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Corps lacked the authority to amend that definition by refusing to comply with it. 41 In refusing to accept the broader definition, the Corps had
acted "unlawfully and in derogation of their responsibilities under Section 404."4 Thus the Corps found itself responsible for issuing permits
on a broadened range of consideration, in an expanded range of waters.
Nation-wide Permits
To help the Corps deal with the vast increase in the number of activities requiring permits, Congress further amended section 404 of the
Clean Water Act in 1977, and exempted some activities from the need
for a permit. 7 The amendments also introduced a kind of automatic
general permit for certain activities of widespread practice which "will
cause only minimal adverse environmental effect when performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment. "I
Although general permits, issued on a regional or nation-wide basis,
became available in a narrow range of situations, the Corps reserved the
authority to: 1) impose conditions on the issuance of those permits, 4 9 2)
modify issued permits,4' 0 3) revoke the grant of a nation-wide permit at
its discretion, 51 and 4) require an applicant to go through an individual
permitting process 52 as the public interest required.2 The appeal of these
permits, from a grantee's standpoint, was that if he qualified for one he
could proceed with his dredge and fill activity, obviating the need for the
time-consuming application process.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

Riverside IrrigationDistrict v. Andrews 54 involved a dispute between
the Army Corps of Engineers and the Riverside Irrigation District which
wanted to use a nation-wide permit for its dredge and fill activites in conjunction with building a dam and reservoir. Because Riverside believed
that it qualified for the nation-wide permit which had been issued previously for dredge and fill activities in waters above the headwaters of a nontidal stream, it intended to proceed without applying for an individual
permit." The project came to the attention of the officers of the federal
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in Denver, who questioned its possibly
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(f)(1) (1982) lists activities exempted from the requirement of dredge
and fill permits among which are normal farming, silviculture, ranching activities, and activities to maintain dikes, dams, levees, and breakwaters.
48. Id. § 1344(e) (1982).
49. 33 C.F.R. § 325.4 (1981).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (1982).
51. Id.
52. 33 C.F.R. § 325.7(e) (1981).
53. See supra note 23.
54. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, '658 F.2d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 764.
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detrimental impact on whooping crane habitat.16 Formal consultation ensued between the FWS and the district engineer of the Corps as required
by the Endangered Species Act.5" The FWS found that the dam was likely to threaten a fifty-three-mile stretch of whooping crane habitat 250 miles
downstream and set out two mitigation measures, either of which, if implemented, would have qualified Riverside for the nation-wide permit. 5
In a letter to the Corps' district engineer, the regional director of FWS
spelled out the two possibilities. The Corps could condition its permit grant
on a requirement that Riverside replace water to approximate the flow
that would occur if the reservoir were not constructed. Alternately, the
Corps could require Riverside to improve or maintain whooping crane
habitat along the Platte River, including water releases combined with
land acquisition and habitat management. 9
Riverside, convinced that it already qualified for a nation-wide permit, felt that the Corps had no authority to base a permitting decision
on operation, as opposed to merely construction, effects. Both parties
agreed that there would be no detrimental effects from the construction
activities.6 Because the effect in question was a depletion in stream flow,
Riverside additionally argued that the Corps was overstepping its water
quality regulation authority under the Clean Water Act, by invading traditional state water quantity regulation and allocation authority." Rather
than comply with either mitigation measure, or apply for an individual
6
permit, Riverside brought suit against the Corps in federal district court. 1
The district court held that the Corps had properly exercised federal
police powers as mandated under the Clean Water Act and under other
federal statutes in a manner consistent with an expressed congressional
the natural environment and on
emphasis on preserving and enhancing
63
safeguarding endangered species.
ANALYSIS

The district court was correct in deciding that the Corps of Engineers
had the authority to deny a nation-wide permit to Riverside. The statute
describing nation-wide permits makes it clear that they are meant strictly for innocuous classes of activities, those which "will have only minimal
56. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667(d) (1982) mandates
that there be consultation between any agency authorizing a stream impoundment or diversion and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
57. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). Section 1536 mandates interagency cooperation to
further programs for the conservation of endangered species.
58. Subsequently a new and more detailed biological opinion was received by Colonel
Andrews pursuant to which he has attempted to require that Riverside apply for an individual
permit as allowed at 33 C.F.R. § 325.7(a) (1984). At this point Riverside may no longer qualify
for a nation-wide permit by complying with one or the other of the mitigation measures.
59. Letter from Donald Minnich, Regional Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service,
to Colonel Stipo (Dec. 20, 1979) (attached to Complaint, supra note 2).
60. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Colo. 1983).
61. Id. at 586.
62. Riverside v. Stipo, 658 F.2d at 764.
63. Riverside v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. at 589.
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adverse environmental effects.' '64 The Riverside project caused more than
minimal effects, disqualifying Riverside from using a nation-wide permit.
Riverside argued, however, that the effects resulting in the permit
denial were not of a type which the Corps had authority to consider. Riverside contended that the Corps could consider only the effects of dredge
and fill activities during the construction phase of its project.6 5 It argued
that water depletion in the South Platte was not a proper consideration,
because it was not an effect of dredge and fill activity during construction. The Corps correctly countered that it is required to act in accordance
not only with the Clean Water Act, but also the mandates of other federal
statutes.
An example of other federal legislation which the Corps must consider
is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.6 It mandates that all
federal agencies must comply with the purposes and provisions of the Act
to ensure that the environmental impacts of any given course of action
are fully considered, and in all cases minimized.6 1 Central to NEPA is the
requirement of an environmental impact statement once an agency determines that a course of action will have an impact upon the environment
above a certain threshold.6 8 The role of NEPA is well stated in Rucker
v. Willis:

NEPA attempts to create a new frame of reference for the consideration of environmental problems by all governmental agencies. Each agency whose actions have environmental side effects
must consider these effects in addition to carrying out their
primary mission. The aim of NEPA is to internalize within each
6 9
agency a procedure for assuming environmental protection.
Given this broad mandate, the Corps must affirmatively consider a wide
range of environmental effects whenever acting on its primary permitting mission.
Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act"0 requires any federal
agency authorizing any modification in a body of water to consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service with a view to conserving wildlife resources."
In Riverside, this consultation resulted in a finding that an endangered
species habitat was at risk. This triggered section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act

72

which makes it mandatory for federal agencies to ensure

that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them will not jeopar64. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1982).
65. Riverside v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. at 586.

66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 11982).
67. Annot., 17 A.L.R. FED. 33, 57 (1973).
68. Id. at 58.
69. 358 F. Supp. 425, 428 (E.D.N.C. 1973), affd, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973); but see
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980), in which the court found
that NEPA requirements are primarily procedural.
70. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667(d) (1982).
71. Id. § 662 (1982).

72. Id. § 1536 (1982).
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dize the continued existence of a threatened or endangered species. The
strong language of section 7 prohibited granting an automatic nation-wide
permit to Riverside. The Corps could not authorize a project which would
likely jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered whooping
crane.
The need for the Corps to consider a project's broad effects was illustrated in Citizen's Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe.13 There
the Corps was found to have misused its authority by granting a permit
after considering only the applicant's dredge and fill activity. The court
found that the Corps should have considered the entire project, and the
need for additional approvals from other agencies prior to a dredge and
fill permit's issuance.
The Corps should therefore approve projects whose effects will conform with all consistent federal mandates. It should examine the
foreseeable effects of projects, without the artificial dichotomy between
construction and operation, and issue permits only to those projects which
comply with federal environmental objectives in operative statutes.
It makes no sense to allow a project to go ahead because there will
be no harm to the environment during construction, only to have it enjoined from going into operation upon completion because it threatens
the continued existence of a threatened or endangered species. This was
precisely what happened in Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority.74 In that
case, environmental groups prevented the completion and enjoined the
operation of the Tellico Dam, which had taken many years and millions
of dollars to build, on the grounds that the dam's operation would eradicate
a species of fish, the now famous snail darter. Similarly, in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, conservation groups sought to enjoin the construction of a section of interstate highway. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the Department of Transportation had taken an
overly narrow view of a project's effects on the endangered Mississippi
Sandhill Crane. The department considered the direct impacts associated
with the taking of a right of way, but failed to consider the impacts of
development and population growth that would develop privately as a
result of the new highway's operation.7 6 The resulting injunction caused
great delay and forced expensive modification of the highway project. To
avoid such wastes of time and money, a permitting agency must consider
all those effects which can reasonably be foreseen to result from the entire project. The Corps should consider the effects of the construction and
the operation of Riverside's dam in deciding not to allow it to use a nationwide permit.
73. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 12d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
Volpe v. Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), cert. denied, Parker v.
Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
74. 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev 'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 437
U.S. 153 (1978).
75. 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), rehg denied,
532 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub. noma. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
76. National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 373 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Viewed from this perspective, permit denial was not based on water
quantity regulation. The Wallop Amendment to the Clean Water Act"
makes clear that:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It
is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State.
The legislative history of this section shows that Senator Wallop was
aware that water quality and water quantity issues cannot always be kept
apart." Water quality treatment requirements often affect water consumption. Thus the exercise of federal police powers to enforce water quality
regulations inevitably affect state water quantity decisions in specific
cases, in spite of the broad policy of the Act to leave states sovereign in
making water quantity decisions.
It is misleading to say that the Corps usurped state prerogatives to
allocate water in the Riverside case. Absent the threat to an endangered
species, the Corps would not have imposed minimal flow requirements
on Riverside's project. Rather, to the extent the Corps' actions can be
characterized as quantity regulation, such regulation is merely incidental to the Corps' compliance with section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
That is, in a conflict between valid state water rights and the federal police
powers to ensure that Congressional environmental goals are met, federal
law takes precedence. As noted in Riverside v. Andrews, "although the
defendant's actions may have a substantial effect on state water rights,
such is the case with many federal laws which particularly pre-empt state
water laws."79
CONCLUSION

Basing a nation-wide permit on a crabbed reading of the Corps of
Engineers' responsibilities and a narrow interpretation of the Corps'
authority would be contrary to the Corps' evolution through the last twenty years. It would also be contrary to the intent of Congress as manifested
in numerous pieces of environmental legislation, and irreconcilable with
the stated purpose of environmental enhancement upon which the Clean
Water Act, and therefore section 404, is based.
The broad environmental goals set out by Congress can only be accomplished if agencies authorized to permit various activities consider
all the foreseeable adverse environmental effects of those activities. By
doing so at an early point in a project's planning, needless waste of time
and money can be prevented. Riverside could be in a worse situation if
77. 33 U.S.C. § 12511g) (1982).
78. White, The EmergingRelationship Between EnuironmentalRegulations and Colorado Water Law, 53 COLO. L. REV. 597, 618, 619 (1982).
79. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 587 (D. Colo. 1983).
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the Corps had issued a dredge and fill permit, and construction of the
Wildcat Reservoir had proceeded. In all likelihood, prior to completion,
the Riverside project would have been halted by champions of the endangered whooping crane.
The propriety of the court's decision in Riverside v. Andrews, and of
the Corps' decision in the first place, is clear. Claims of states' rights to
regulate water quantity cannot override the federal environmental mandate. Some fundamental shift will have to occur in our national priorities
before Riverside and its ilk can argue that their state water rights are
paramount to national goals of preserving endangered species and their
habitats.
TAMARA VINCELEVTE
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